I would like to extend this work in three directions. The first would involve continuing my study of the development of Kant's philosophy of mind. Much work on this has already been performed by Karl Ameriks [166], but useful work remains to be done exploring Kant's rejection of the assumption of that the soul is a substance and the development of his theory of inner sense. In addition, there is a need for a definitive reckoning of which of Kant's positive views about the mind/body connection remained in place during the critical period. The Lectures on Metaphysics would continue to be useful, especially the Metaphysik Mrongivius, which was based on lectures Kant gave in the 1782-83 academic year.
I would also like to pursue the large project I describe in the Preface [167], namely exploring Kant's views on the role of the body in cognition throughout the rest of his career. Lorne Falkenstein has shown that this theme was important (though submerged) in the Critique of Pure Reason [168]. Since it also emerged as a central focus of the Selbstsetzungslehre section of the Opus postumum, there is an interesting story to be told about the human body in Kant's critical and late works.
Finally, I would like to explore the significance of Kant's skepticism about understanding primary forces in the critical period, especially in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and the Critique of Pure Reason. Here too there is room for a larger historical project: investigating Kant's understanding of this skepticism from the early 1760s until his last works.
NOTES
166. See especially Ameriks' Kant's Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
168. See Falkenstein's Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), Chapter 3. I am grateful to Quassim Cassam for providing this reference.