

INTRODUCTION

I begin this introduction by surveying several topics in Kant's pre-critical philosophy that are essential for understanding Kant's solution to the mind/body problem in *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1747). These topics are real possibility, change, interaction, systematicity, and succession. Although each of them could be the subject of a dissertation, my focus is on how they illuminate Kant's earliest solution to the mind/body problem.

I use the notion of real possibility to pose many questions about mind/body interaction. For example, I argue that Kant sought to explain how the action of matter on mind was really, and not merely logically, possible. I use the notion of change to explain many of Kant's specific doctrines that are relevant to his solution to the mind/body problem, for example his doctrine that every change involves the exercise of a transeunt or outwardly-directed force.

Since Kant's views on mind/body interaction can only be understood in terms of his general account of interaction, that notion is important to my study. Kant believed that the specific interactions that are possible in our world are determined by the principles that govern the systematic unity of our world. Kant also maintained that those principles govern the specific way that substances' force is exerted in our world, namely gradually or a bit by bit over time.¹

¹ See sections 1.2 and 2.3 below.

In the rest of this introduction, I discuss these topics. I briefly compare their roles in Kant's critical and pre-critical philosophies, and I discuss some of their connections with Kant's solution to the mind/body problem. The first section focuses on real possibility, the second on interaction, and the third on systematic unity. The fourth section provides an overview of the structure of the rest of this dissertation and summarizes some of my main arguments and conclusions.

i. A lifelong concern with real possibility

Understanding Kant's early notion of real possibility would require a dissertation of its own, for there are numerous interpretive difficulties including Kant's slide between discussing the real possibility of concepts and the real possibility of their objects. The focus of this study is Kant's solution to the mind/body problem in his *Living Forces* and his attempts to improve his understanding of mind/body interaction in several later pre-critical works. My discussion of mind/body interaction is situated within broader discussions of the location of souls in space and the possibility of the interaction of substances in space in general, but I discuss these topics only as much as is required to illuminate Kant's pre-critical understanding of mind/body interaction. The same caveat holds true for my analysis of Kant's pre-critical notion of real possibility: I discuss only the aspects of this general topic that are most closely related to my specific analysis of Kant's demonstration of the real possibility of mind/body interaction.

In addition to metaphysics, Kant's early writings focused on the sciences of mechanics, dynamics, and cosmology. He discussed space, time, and motion and problems such as defining force and reconciling mechanism and teleology. This led him to consider what he later called "real possibility". For example, he was concerned with the real—and not merely logical—possibility of the action of matter by means of forces. Kant also discussed quite general questions of real possibility, for example the real possibility of change and coexistence.

This interest continued in the critical period. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Kant worked on many of the same scientific questions. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/7), he gave a new account of the real possibility of coexistence and change. In both periods, and indeed throughout his life, Kant sought a method of philosophy that could explain real possibility.

Kant's notion of real possibility is notoriously difficult to interpret, and in the period covered by this study, 1747 through the mid-1770s, Kant's understanding of real possibility was relatively undeveloped. His early use of the idea may have been influenced by Leibniz's distinction between the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, which suggested that philosophy must strive to do more than demonstrate that a concept is free from contradiction.² Kant

² I owe this point to Daniel Warren. On Leibniz, see *On Freedom and Possibility* (1680), the *Monadology* (1714) §§31ff, and his second and fifth *Letter to Clarke* (1715-16).

maintained that explaining the genuine or real possibility of a concept required showing that the concept has a ground in actual existence. For example, one way to show that a concept is really possible is to experience an instance of that concept. This illustrates that, despite the possible influence of Leibniz's use of the principle of sufficient reason, Kant's notion of real possibility was resolutely anti-Leibnizian: Kant rejected the Leibnizian idea that possibility can be defined independently of the actual, and independently of all knowledge of the actual.³

It must be emphasized, however, that Kant's interest in real possibility went beyond empirical knowledge of a concept's instances.⁴ He was also interested in the real possibility of concepts whose instances either do not exist at a certain time or that exist but cannot be the objects of empirical knowledge. In the critical period, Kant's strategy for handling these cases was to connect grounds of real possibility with the conditions of the possibility of experience.⁵ In the pre-critical period, however, Kant had no clear method for handling cases of real possibility that went beyond what can be found in experience, although he did

³ This was entailed by Leibniz's doctrine that the complete notion of a concept contains all its predicates. This idea was prominent in Leibniz's later metaphysical writings, including the *New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and the Union of the Soul and the Body* (1695).

⁴ I thank Daniel Warren for emphasizing this point in discussion.

⁵ For example, see the Postulates of Empirical Thought in General section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

use one crucial resource, the concept of God, the instance of which he believed existed but was not an object of experience.⁶ God's existence provided Kant with a model for judging that a concept was really possible even though its object was not found in experience.

As my discussion of Kant's notion of the divine schema of our world demonstrates (see sections 1.5 and 2.1 below), Kant considered God the source of principles that govern the world. As I show in my analysis of Kant's pre-critical demonstration of the real possibility of mind/body interaction in sections 1.2 through 1.6, Kant used these principles to ground the real possibility of other concepts whose instances are not found in experience, thus assigning to them the role that he later accorded to the conditions of the possibility of experience.

ii. Pre-critical dogmatism and the invention of primary forces

Kant's lifelong concern with real possibility was an important continuity between his pre-critical and critical works. Throughout this study, however, I emphasize how Kant's early understanding of the mind/body problem was *not* critical.⁷ There was an important difference between Kant's critical and pre-critical

⁶ On this see, for example, the *Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* of 1763. This was brought to my attention by Daniel Warren.

⁷ I am grateful to Hannah Ginsborg for emphasizing this theme in comments to an earlier draft of this dissertation.

discussions of real possibility. To use a critical distinction, Kant's early arguments were connected with the possibility of the *existence* of things (e.g., of objects co-existing or changing), his later arguments with the possibility of our *experience* of those things. In the critical period, Kant did not attempt to explain the possibility of objects simpliciter; one of his central critical claims was precisely that we can have no knowledge of the real possibility of an object considered apart from the context of our experience. In the Third Analogy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argued that *our perception* of objects coexisting in space presupposes the concept of dynamic interaction—the formal intuition of space presupposes the concept of interaction in a *transcendental* sense. By contrast, in *Living Forces*, Kant discussed the real possibility of mind/body interaction in what he would later call a transcendentially realist sense.

The Third Analogy was meant to establish the real possibility of dynamic interaction in (roughly) this sense: This possibility is established *a priori* because Kant showed that the concept is a presupposition of our perception of bodies in space.⁸ In the Discipline of Pure Reason, Kant cautioned that "it is only possible

⁸ Little work has been done laying out the exact argument of the Third Analogy. Recent critics have tended to view it as a trivial application of the Second Analogy—see, for example, Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1982); Jonathan Bennett, *Kant's Analytic* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966); Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); and Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen,

for our reason to use the conditions of possible experience as the conditions of the possibility of things, but it is by no means possible for it as it were to create new ones, independent of these conditions" (A771/B799).⁹ Kant concluded, in part, that we cannot hope to demonstrate the real possibility of several logical possibilities, including three that are important to this study: "new original forces" (A770/B798), a substance "which would be present in space without impenetrability" (A770/B798), and the doctrine that the soul is a simple substance (A771/B799).¹⁰

In the critical period, Kant believed that philosophy could aspire to show the real possibility *in a transcendental sense* of things we are given in experience, including attractive and repulsive forces. To do this, he maintained, requires an argument that these forces are presupposed by any possible *a priori* understanding of matter consistent with the categories, that is that they are transcendental presuppositions of a metaphysical explanation of the schematized

1966). H.J. Paton's discussion in *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936) is more illuminating. The most detailed discussion of which I am aware is Eric Watkin's "Kant's Third Analogy of Experience," *Kant-Studien* 88 (1997), pp. 406-441.

⁹ All references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are given in standard A/B notation. Unless otherwise specified, the translations are from Paul Guyer's and Allen Wood's translation in *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). References to the rest of Kant's works are to the standard *Akademie* edition.

¹⁰ I discuss the first two possibilities in detail in Chapters Two and Three below and the third one in Chapter Four below.

categories as they apply to the concept of matter. Kant emphasized that these transcendental conclusions established nothing about the real possibility of the *existence* of these forces. In the *Metaphysical Foundations*, Kant warned that:

[One] must not presume to assume either of them as actual, because the authorization to set up a hypothesis irremissibly requires that the possibility of what is assumed be entirely certain. But in the case of fundamental forces, their possibility can never be comprehended. (4:524)¹¹

A central problem with interpreting the critical project is understanding the positive claims that Kant made about "transcendental" real possibility.¹² This example suggests that there is an important general question about exactly how Kant's pre-critical questions about the possibility of the existence of things were transformed into transcendental questions about the possibility of our experience of those things. Although I hope to pursue this question later, to maintain my focus on Kant's pre-critical understanding of mind/body interaction I must for now raise and question and then move ahead.

¹¹ This translation is from James Ellington's *Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Material Nature* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), p.79.

¹² For example, there appears to be no straightforward answer to the question of whether Kant was a realist or an instrumentalist with respect to force.

iii. Kant's critical approach to coexistence and systematic unity

As I have already noted, understanding Kant's general account of interaction is essential for understanding his specific account of mind/body interaction. In the critical period, a relevant text was the Analogies of Experience section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant examined the real possibility of our *cognition* of simultaneously existing things. He concluded that the possibility of our experience of coexistence presupposes things' mutual interaction: "[Substances] must stand in dynamical community (mediately or immediately) if their simultaneity is to be cognized in any possible experience" (A212/B259). Kant maintained that, although we recognize that interaction occurs, we can understand neither its metaphysical nature nor its ultimate source: "we cannot construct *a priori* the least concept of the possibility of dynamical interaction, and the category of the pure understanding does not serve for thinking up such a thing but only for understanding it where it is encountered in experience" (A770/B798). In Chapter Three, I argue that the failings of his early account of mind/body interaction led Kant to this position.

Kant's understanding of the systematic unity of nature also shifted. The pre-critical works sought to explicate the real possibility of the unity of nature; Kant concluded that the objects in our world are systematically connected by virtue of the effects of God's agency. In his critical period, however, Kant rejected

this position as “hypostasized” unity (A692/B720). He argued that philosophy cannot prove the existence of an order of nature or systematic unity, but can show that such unity is a condition of the possibility of our systematic *experience* of the world. In place of a metaphysical principle of divine intelligence, Kant provided “a transcendental principle...through which such a systematic unity, as pertaining to the object itself, is assumed *a priori* as necessary” (A650/B678). Kant came to deny what he earlier assumed: the systematic unity of nature is never “given,” but must be “projected” (A647/B675).

The pre-critical and critical texts also differed sharply on the status and nature of the theories and principles grounded by a philosophical account of unity. In the critical period Kant denied, and in the pre-critical period he affirmed, that an understanding of nature’s unity leads to “objective” and not “subjective” principles and maxims, which have “constitutive” and not merely “regulative” employment.¹³ Kant came to see that his early project of grounding the systematic unity of nature in divine intelligence was doomed, for this type of unity can only be hypothetically assumed. His critical methodology, by contrast, allowed him to

¹³ Explicating the inter-related distinctions between assuming/knowning, being given/being projected, having an objective status/subjective status, having a constitutive employment/regulative employment would be the task of a separate dissertation. The point I make here does not require me to settle any of the nettlesome controversies surrounding that issue, although I do presuppose a basic familiarity with Kant's central texts about systematic unity, e.g. the Appendix to the Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the First and Second Introductions to the *Critique of Judgment*.

establish a transcendental principle that justifies unity being “presupposed *a priori*” (A650/B678). Like all others, Kant’s own earlier attempt to establish constitutive knowledge of nature’s unity must fail:

...if I antecedently make a highest ordering being the ground [of unity], then the unity of nature will in fact be done away with. For then this unity is entirely foreign and contingent in relation to the nature of things, and it cannot be cognized from the universal laws thereof. Hence arises a vicious circle in one’s proof, where one presupposes what really ought to be proved. (A693/B721)

Kant’s broader lesson was that a philosophy that pins its hopes on understanding the real possibility of objects themselves cannot succeed. This insight was hard-won in the first decades of Kant’s philosophical career: it was the failure of his earliest solution to the mind/body problem that first taught him this lesson.

iv. The structure and aims of this study

This study presents Kant’s pre-critical views on the real possibility of change and coexistence and his metaphysical account of the unity of the world insofar as this illuminates his earliest solution to the mind/body problem. The first chapter presents and evaluates Kant’s earliest solution to the mind/body problem in *Living Forces*, part I, sections one through eight. I discuss sections five and six, where Kant actually gave his solution, at the end of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a number of topics that are connected to Kant’s solution. After a preliminary section where I discuss Kant’s general relation to the post-Leibnizian German rationalist philosophical tradition, I focus in sections 1.1

and 1.2 on his criticism of a prominent view of motion, action, and change that he considered incompatible with mind/body interaction. This view, which I call the *vis motrix* view, was held by Wolff and other successors of Leibniz. I discuss Kant's interpretation of this view in *Living Forces* section one and two criticisms of the view, his argument in section two that it could not explain the source of change, and his obscure suggestions in section three that the *vis motrix* view is metaphysically incoherent.

In the remainder of section 1.2, I discuss Kant's own understanding of motion, which presupposed conceptions of action and change that were considerably broader than those defended by Wolff and other supporters of the *vis motrix* view. I emphasize that a crucial difference between Kant's view and the *vis motrix* view was that Kant denied that changes in motion are the *only* effect of the exercise of force. Kant's solution to the mind/body problem can only be understood within the context of his general account of this broader conception of action and change.

In section 1.3, I discuss how Kant's use of the principle of sufficient reason in the early sections of *Living Forces* paralleled his use of it in an important later argument, his argument for the principle of succession in the *New Elucidation* of 1755. This section helps to clarify Kant's broader concepts of change and action and evaluates his argument in *Living Forces* against the metaphysical doctrine of

pre-established harmony. In section 1.4, I discuss Kant's crucial notion of transeunt inner change and I evaluate his argument in section four that this change is the sufficient reason for changes in bodies' motions. As I explain, an inner change is a change in a substance's inner states, a change of internal determinations. I will call an inner change "transeunt" when it is an inner change of a substance that is the effect of a transeunt or externally-directed force acting on that substance.

Kant's broader conception of change and action, according to which change is not limited to changes of motion, allowed for a doctrine of transeunt internal change.¹⁴ In *Living Forces* section four, he argued that this change is the cause of motion. His argument was complex, and at times obscure, but it was vitally important to his solution to the mind/body problem: Kant believed that transeunt inner change could also explain the production of representations in souls, so by showing that it is the source of bodies' motion, he hoped to establish that changes of motion and changes of representational states were both capable of being produced by the same transeunt force.

I present Kant's solution to the mind/body in *Living Forces* sections five and six as an application or extension of his argument in section four. I find it

¹⁴ I owe this way of viewing Kant's argumentative strategy to Daniel Warren.

convenient, however, to reverse the order of Kant's text and discuss sections seven and eight before discussing sections five and six. In these latter sections, Kant connected his notion of transeunt inner change to his explanation of our world's unity. I show that according to Kant, the specific manner in which substances' essential force is exerted in our world supported two important conclusions. The first was that every substance in our world exists in space or has a spatial location. The second conclusion, which I discuss in greater detail in section 2.4 below, was that each substance in the world exerts an attractive force on every other substance whose intensity diminishes over distance in accordance with Newton's inverse square law of universal gravitation.

The large cosmological and metaphysical issues that Kant raised, and that I discuss in section 1.5, help illuminate his solution to the mind/body problem. I discuss this argument in the last section of chapter one, section 1.6. I discuss various aspects of Kant's understanding of the mind/body problem and I present his solution within the context of the metaphysical topics I introduced earlier. I conclude that Kant's argument was weakened by the dogmatism that pervades *Living Forces*, that he may have been committed to an objectionable hylozoism, and that there is a major difficulty with understanding his metaphysical dualism because he could not refute the claim that souls and the simple constituents of bodies were of the same material nature.

In the second chapter, I connect Kant's earliest solution to the mind/body problem to several elements of his metaphysics of the 1750s. I am especially concerned with the principle of succession, the principle of coexistence, and Kant's notion of the divine schema of our world. The principle of succession stated that "no change can happen to substances except in so far as they are connected with other substances" (1:410).¹⁵ This principle stated formally a key doctrine of *Living Forces*, namely that every change involves the exercise of a transeunt force. For example, the principle of succession entailed that when a soul changes its state, that soul must be in genuine interaction with something else.

The other two elements of Kant's metaphysics that I discuss in Chapter Two—the principle of coexistence and the notion of the divine schema of our world—entailed that when a soul changes its states, it interacts not only with other souls, but with bodies as well. The principle of coexistence specified conditions under which two substances exist in the same world. Kant's negative point was that substances' mere existence does not guarantee that they exist in the same world: as Kant argued in sections seven and eight of *Living Forces* (and as

¹⁵ This quotation is from the *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* of 1755. The translation I use is David Walford's and Ralf Meerbote's in their *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

I discuss in section 1.5), it may be the case that substances exist in metaphysically separate worlds.

If two substances exist in the same world, Kant argued, this is because they are capable of interacting. As his discussion of the principle of coexistence made clear, Kant presupposed that substances' mere existence does not guarantee that they can interact with each other. What was required in addition to existence, Kant maintained, is that God's agency guarantee that they can interact. He argued that each metaphysically separate world is unified in virtue of a divine schema that determines the principles governing interaction in that world. It follows from this that two objects exist in the same world just in case the divine schema of that world guarantees that they are capable of interaction. Thus if our world contains both immaterial souls and material bodies, these things must be capable of genuine interaction—otherwise, they would not exist in the same world. Specifically, Kant argued that the divine schema of our world is such that substances interact via the exertion of transeunt forces in the manner that Kant first discussed in *Living Forces* sections one through eight.

In this way, the elements of Kant's metaphysics I discuss in Chapter Two are connected with Kant's solution to the mind/body problem that I discuss in Chapter One. I address these topics in sections 2.1 and 2.3. Section 2.2 is devoted to a curious text, the Appendix to the *Universal Natural History* of 1755,

where Kant discusses specific interactions between human bodies and human souls. What emerges is a fascinating account of the role of the human body in cognition, which I discuss under the rubric of Kant's account of "embodied cognition."¹⁶

Kant maintained that the action of the body on the soul was a causal condition on *all* acts of cognition, not just for the reception of sensation. Kant's position was that all of our cognitive abilities, even abilities that seem purely mental like the "readiness to connect and compare representations," are "wholly dependent" on the material constitution of our bodies (1:180).¹⁷

I discuss several features of Kant's discussion of embodied cognition, including his speculative comparison of us to the inhabitants of the other planets and his charge that "the lives of most men" are ill-suited for promoting the development of the type of body/mind action that is necessary for high quality cognition (1:182). I also explain why Kant believed that people whose bodies are the most nimble can, in virtue of the manner in which their bodies can act on their

¹⁶ I use this label and not the more familiar "embodied epistemology" because Kant provided a metaphysical account of the causal conditions on thinking and he did not raise epistemological questions about the justification of our beliefs. I am grateful to Hannah Ginsborg for pointing out the problems with labeling Kant's position an "embodied epistemology."

¹⁷ The translation I use is Stanley Jaki's *Immanuel Kant: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1981).

souls, expect to possess deeper insight, quicker wit, and to resist sin better than most.

My examination of Kant's somewhat fanciful comparison of the inhabitants of the planets allows me to draw two philosophical conclusions about Kant's understanding of mind/body interaction in 1755. The first is that Kant was committed to viewing all of the mind's conceptual activity as being dependent on sensory material that it receives from the body. The second is that Kant understood cognition to involve a succession of mental states that was dependent on a corresponding succession of bodily states.¹⁸

Kant concluded that the character of the successive states of the body upon which the soul is dependent can degrade the overall speed of cognition and the quality of the mind's own activities, for example its ability to recall, compare, and abstract from representations and its ability to form judgments about intentions and motives. This degradation took two forms. First, a body that is insufficiently quick and nimble will have a succession of states that cannot "track" changes in the world effectively: a sluggish body responds only to the most gross changes in the world and is unable to respond accurately to quick or subtle changes. This affects the quality of the sensory material that the body presents to

¹⁸ I am grateful to Daniel Warren for providing me with this way of understanding Kant's thesis.

the mind: since a sluggish body could not track the world accurately, it could not provide the world with accurate, timely, and finely-grained sensory information about the world. Second, and perhaps more significantly, a sluggish body prevents the soul from exercising its own powers in any but a gross manner. If our bodies were less sluggish and more nimble, Kant argued, the mind's own powers could make a better effort to overcome the confusions engendered by the gross sensory input it is given. Unfortunately for us, he concluded, the same bodily constitution that degrades this sensory input also degrades the efforts of our reason to overcome confusion.

Chapter Two contains four sections. In section 2.1, I discuss Kant's account of the divine schema of our world and his related discussion of the essential attractive and repulsive forces of matter. In section 2.2, I discuss his account of the role of the body in cognition in the *Universal Natural History*. These sections mainly contain exegesis of what I take to be little-appreciated and interesting features of Kant's early metaphysical account of mind/body interaction.

Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present a critical analysis of, respectively, the metaphysical principles of succession and coexistence and Kant's troubled account of souls' locations in space. I argue that Kant's account of the location of the soul with respect to the body generated a problem that plagued Kant throughout the 1760s. Kant held that our souls fully penetrate our bodies in the sense that one's

soul and one's body are located in the same volume of space at the same time. Unfortunately for Kant, this contradicted his account of how substances exist in the space of our world. According to the divine schema of our world, a necessary condition of a substance being located in space is that it possess a repulsive force thus impenetrability. Our souls and our bodies can interact only if they are both in our world, but this is true only if both types of substances are impenetrable and thus incapable of existing in the same space at the same time.

For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, long after he recognized the contradiction Kant was committed to the doctrine that souls fully penetrate their bodies.¹⁹ In Chapter Three, I argue that Kant's slow recognition of this problem, and his tortured ineffectual responses to it, were extremely important for his philosophical development. One of the facets of this problem relates to a conclusion I raise at the end of Chapter One, namely that Kant could not prove that immaterial simples were distinct from the material simples (physical monads) out of which bodies are composed. It is difficult, I argue, to see how Kant's interpretation of the divine schema of our world is compatible with his metaphysical dualism: as I explain in Chapter Three, the condition that substances in our world

¹⁹ Eventually, in texts written after the period that I discuss in this dissertation, Kant dropped the assumption that souls are substances.

possess a repulsive force seems to entail that our world contains only material simples.

What Kant required was an explanation of souls' locations in space that was compatible with souls being unextended, immaterial substances that could penetrate material bodies. In 1766, when he published *Dreams of a Spirit Seer*, Kant concluded that he did not possess the philosophical resources to solve this problem. Chapter Three focuses on Kant's attempts to limit the damage of this omission to his system of metaphysics.

I argue that he found little comfort. In 1766, Kant believed that if one presupposed that the soul is an immaterial substance, then the only reasonable account of the location of the soul within one's body is that it must be present throughout the body.²⁰ There is evidence that Kant accepted this conditional in earlier texts and that, because he also accepted its antecedent, he was committed to its consequent. However, as I discuss in Chapter Three, in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* he concluded that we have no grounds for asserting the antecedent.

Kant believed that reason was incapable of attaining any deep understanding of the fundamental forces of material and immaterial substances. In the case of the repulsive and attractive forces of matter, he argued, we can recog-

²⁰ I am grateful to Daniel Warren for providing me with this characterization of Kant's position.

nize the exertion of these forces in experience, but we cannot understand their metaphysical natures or grounds. He concluded that the case was worse for the forces of immaterial substances, which he thought were not directly presented in experience: these forces are literally “unthinkable,” and we can neither understand nor recognize them. This meant that philosophy had no hope of proving that our souls are simple immaterial substances and not physical monads.

Chapter Three contains four sections. Section 3.1 sets out my interpretation of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* against several interpretations in the secondary literature. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss Kant’s newly skeptical attitude about understanding the primary forces of material and immaterial substances. In section 3.4, I discuss the dire implications of Kant’s inability to refute materialism for his understanding of mind/body interaction.

Chapter Four focuses on the recently-translated *Metaphysik L₁* lectures, which were based on lectures Kant gave in the mid-1770s. After surveying the problems that had undermined his earliest solution to the mind/body problem, I discuss how Kant drew upon a contrast between inner and outer sense that he first developed in the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 to ground a new understanding of mind/body interaction. The idea that the soul is an object of inner sense that possesses a virtual presence in space and not a local presence, provided Kant with a new explanation of the mind/body problem and, he thought, allowed him to resolve a number of the difficulties that had left him perplexed

when he wrote *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. The “inner sense thesis” also grounded new accounts of the tight relation between the soul and its body and of the role of the body in cognition. Kant himself admitted that the inner sense thesis did not allow him to solve the mind/body problem, and I conclude that several of his positive conclusions were undermined by his conflating epistemic and ontological claims.

This chapter ends with general conclusions about Kant’s understanding of the mind/body problem in the mid-1770s and the importance of this problem for the subsequent development of the critical philosophy. I conclude that, although his understanding of mind/body connectedness remained inadequate in the mid-1770s, Kant’s struggles with this and related issues contributed to the development of systematic critical strictures on metaphysical reasoning and to the critical theory of inner sense.