TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

Andrew N. Carpenter

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SUMMARY

This essay considers attempts to refute scepticism by transcendental argumentation; in particular I explore attempts to refute traditional "Cartesian" scepticism with idealistic transcendental arguments. My main conclusions are:

• Transcendental arguments are indispensable for a refutation of scepticism, not redundant;
• Idealistic transcendental arguments cannot refute Cartesian sceptical doubts;
• Traditional sceptical doubts can be reformulated so as to be effective against accounts of knowledge based on an idealistic theory of truth;
• It is possible in principle that idealistic ("Kantian") transcendental arguments can refute such idealistic sceptical doubts and also that non-idealistic ("Strawsonian") transcendental arguments can refute non-idealistic doubts;
• Merely to assume a theory of truth and just to dismiss certain sceptical doubts based on another theory of truth is to beg the question against the sceptic; but all arguments for a particular theory of truth beg the question against radical sceptics;
• Because radical scepticism must be taken seriously, a complete refutation of scepticism would require constructing both types of transcendental arguments, viz. Kantian idealistic arguments (to refute idealistic doubts) and Strawsonian non-idealistic arguments (to refute non-idealistic, "Cartesian" doubts).

I argue that the allure of idealism as a way to refute scepticism is wholly unfounded, viz. because (1) sceptical doubts can be reformulated so as to be effective against idealistic conceptions of knowledge and (2) idealistic arguments cannot refute traditional Cartesian doubts. But although it doesn't lead where many have hoped, I argue that--in a strange way, for different reasons than are commonly supposed--idealism represents a road which must nevertheless be taken if scepticism is to be refuted. That is, though most of the essay attempts to establish that refuting Cartesian scepticism requires that they be separated, it also follows from my argument that transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism must not be kept apart if scepticism is to be fully refuted.

In the Introduction I discuss--and attempt to solve--a dilemma about the premises of anti-sceptical arguments which seems to show that anti-sceptical argumentation is impossible. From this discussion I develop an analysis of scepticism according to which moderately sceptical doubts can be refuted only if the retreat into radical scepticism can be blocked. I discuss four or five ways of refuting scepticism, and argue that traditional "strong" transcendental arguments are the only plausible candidates for blocking the retreat into radical scepticism. I also discuss several weaker, non anti-sceptical transcendental arguments.

Chapters 1 and 2 contain detailed exegesis of Kant's arguments in the Deduction, Analogies, and Refutation. On my reading the Deduction and Analogies do not establish anti-sceptical conclusions, while the argument of the Refutation avoids being manifestly invalid only if it is understood as tacitly presupposing Kant's transcendental idealism.

Chapter 3 discusses transcendental idealism in depth. I defend an interpretation of Kant's idealism as a strange version of the coherence theory of truth for the empirically real world. I distinguish my interpretation from several others (including Walker's coherence theory interpretation), which tend to see Kant as committed to a rather strong scepticism.

I conclude that there are two types of sceptical doubts (based on idealistic and non-idealistic theories of truth) and two types of transcendental arguments (idealistic "Kantian" arguments and non-idealistic "Strawsonian" arguments), and that a complete refutation of scepticism would require that both an idealistic and a non-idealistic transcendental argument be produced. I think that there is an antinomy of sorts: although we know that only one theory of truth is correct, we cannot avoid the burden of constructing both kinds of transcendental arguments because it is impossible to give a non question-begging argument in support of one or the other theories of truth.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Transcendental arguments and scepticism

1. The dilemma of anti-sceptical premises (page 2)

2. Radical scepticism and indirect anti-sceptical strategies (6)

3. The strengths of transcendental arguments (12)

Chapter 1: The deductions and analogies, Kant's weak transcendental arguments

4. Kant's theories of judgment and experience (15)

5. The subjective and objective deductions in A (19)

6. The deduction in B (26)

7. Temporal succession and the principle of the analogies (31)

8. The argument of the first analogy (34)

Chapter 2: The refutation, Kant's strong transcendental argument

9. Kant's anti-sceptical intentions (40)

10. The first analogy misapplied (42)

11. A sympathetic reading of the refutation (46)

12. The "belief" objection to transcendental arguments (49)

13. A sketch of Kant's response (54)

Chapter 3: The movement to transcendental idealism

14. Cartesian scepticism revisited (57)

15. Kant's impure coherence theory of truth (63)

16. Other interpretations of transcendental idealism (73)

17. Transcendental idealism and scepticism (77)

Conclusion: Transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism

18. A complete refutation of scepticism? (87)

Bibliography (90)